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Abstract
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In many developing and middle-income countries, 
decentralization reforms are promoting changes in 
governance structures that are reshaping the relationship 
between local governments and citizens.  The success of 
these decentralization reforms depends on the existence 
of sound public financial systems both at the central and 
local levels. This paper focuses on the role of budgeting 
as a critical tool in reform efforts, highlighting problems 
that might impede successful local government budget 
development and implementation. The attainment 
of effective local government accountability and 
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effort in the department to study local governance systems and decentralization in the client countries. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at syilmaz@
worldbank.org.  
transparency is not an end itself, but rather it represents 
the means to support better decision-making on national 
and local budgeting. Community based schemes for 
enhancing local government accountability need to 
combine legal, political, and administrative mechanisms 
with proactive community involvement. Of particular 
importance are the legal and budgetary instruments that 
require input from local community members on certain 
local government decisions and instruments that increase 
accessibility for the press or the general public at large to 
information on government activities.    
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Across many developing and middle-income countries, reforms are being 
undertaken to improve governance by introducing new institutional and technical systems 
intended to increase the transparency and accountability of governments. Most evident 
are efforts to decentralize government functions to lower tiers of government. Through 
these reforms, governments are promoting changes to governance structures that are 
reshaping the relationship between local governments and citizens. However, the success 
of these reforms depends on the existence of sound public financial systems both at the 
central and local levels: weak or non-existent or absent public financial management 
functions and institutions are likely to negate any advantages that might be inherent in 
bringing public services “closer” to people (Ahmad, Albino-War and Singh 2006). As a 
primary financial management tool of governments, the annual budget is a logical place 
to focus reform efforts. Budgets intersect with all aspects of governance reform including 
fiscal policy, administrative reform, anticorruption efforts, social policy and service 
delivery.  
At the local level, local
1 government budgeting can be described as a series of 
steps that link policy (people’s preferences and needs) to financial planning (budget) to 
actual budget implementation (service delivery, operations). While efforts on local 
government budgeting innovations in developing and middle-income countries are 
relatively new, and few quantitative evaluations have emerged, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that increased local community involvement in the budget process can lead to 
improvements in budget efficiency, service delivery and investment in underserved areas.  
Local government budget innovations are designed to improve financial 
accountability, which requires that municipal governments prudently manage their 
finances to ensure integrity in their financial and non-financial reporting, control, 
budgeting, and performance systems (Sahgal and Chakrapani 2000). Financial 
accountability also necessitates reporting comprehensively on what local governments 
have achieved with their expenditures.  Financial accountability of local governments is 
strengthened by integrating approaches that marry supply-side public sector 
accountability (i.e. publicly available audit findings) with demand-side social 
accountability instruments (i.e. accessible local government financial information).   
                                                 
1 We use the terms subnational, local and municipal interchangeably throughout the text to refer to levels of 
government below the central government.  4 | Page 
 
The supply side of accountability, which is also known as public accountability,
2
is the hallmark of and a sine qua non for good governance (Bovens 2006). Supply side 
measures to improve downward financial accountability include strong local capacity for 
budgeting and public financial management; standards for control on intergovernmental 
transfer revenues (i.e., clean audit reports, submission of financial statements); 
publication of transfer figures; transparent local public audit systems—with publicly 
available audit findings, clear rules for responsible local borrowing (including rules 
regarding defaults), public access to borrowing information, and clearly defined rules 
regarding hard budget constraints for local governments. 
Demand side accountability, also known as social accountability, refers to a broad 
range of actions and mechanisms beyond voting that citizens can use to hold the state and 
providers of public services accountable. Demand side measures for financial 
accountability include publicly accessible local government financial information 
(including budgets, end-of-year financial statements and periodic implementation 
progress reports during fiscal year); public involvement in budgetary process through 
participatory budgeting practices; gender-sensitive planning, budgeting, and resource 
allocation, reinforced by gender audits; independent budget analysis and participatory 
public expenditure tracking programs that monitor budget execution and leakage of 
funds. 
The focus of this paper is to outline the role of budgeting as a critical tool of local 
government finance in developing and middle-income countries; highlighting problems 
that might impede successful local government budget development and implementation. 
The paper presents guidelines and suggestions for improvements to strengthen local 
budgeting practices in developing countries. We assert that local government 
accountability and transparency is not an end itself, but rather it represents the means to 
support better decision-making on national and local budgeting.  We also provide 
evidence that community (demand-side) participation is necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition, for enabling greater local government accountability. Community based 
schemes for enhancing local government accountability generally need to combine legal, 
political, and administrative mechanisms with proactive community involvement. Of 
particular importance are the legal and budgetary instruments that require input from 
local community members on certain local government decisions and instruments that 
increase accessibility for the press or the general public at large to information on 
government activities.    
                                                 
2 Public accountability refers to the institutionalized practice of account giving—it focuses on public sector 
managers who spend public money, exercise public authority, and manage a corporate body under public 
law. Public account giving provides political representatives and voters with the necessary inputs for 
judging the fairness, effectiveness, and efficiency of their governance system (Manin, Przeworski, and 
Stokes 1999). The formal doctrine of elected representatives’ responsibility rests upon the notion of 
representative democracy and parliamentary sovereignty. The elected representatives of people—
parliament—bring the government—the executive—to account. Parliament enacts administrative laws to 
enforce accountability. On the other hand, poor governance and lack of public sector accountability may 
result from a number of factors including civil service incompetence, lack of efficient institutions, and 
pervasive corruption (Schaeffer 2005). 2  Theory and Evolution of Budgeting 
In social sciences a theory is a testable model of human interactions capable of 
predicting future occurrences or events of the same kind as well as capable of being 
tested through experiment or otherwise verified through observation. Budgeting does not 
have a theory in the classical sense of providing an orientation to the field, stating 
assumptions and pointing to some hypotheses about what causes what (Rubin 1997). 
According to Rubin, budget theory “is fragmented and incomplete… [it] is in the process 
of being invented” (Rubin 1997: 185).  In other words, the theory of effective budgeting 
is continually evolving. Scholars see “the study of budgeting as part of a larger research 
agenda which would ultimately enable prediction of consequences and the comparative 
analysis of governmental policy” (Caiden 1994: 44).  Many budget policies, procedures, 
and technical practices that we currently associate with modern budgeting were 
developed during the nineteenth century when major changes in budget practices 
occurred in France. At the time Napoleon’s primary concern was with mastering the 
military budget. To obtain better information and control on military spending, Napoleon 
established the Cours des Comptes (Webber and Wildavsky 1986).   
Early 19
th century France saw the establishment of the words budget and 
budgetary procedures. By the 1860s, France had developed a uniform accounting system 
that it applied to all departments and units within departments, a standard fiscal year, 
conventions on how long encumbrances can be held open after the close of the fiscal 
year, and a requirement that all departments explain programmatically and account 
fiscally for all funds which they were allocated. The budget was considered to be one of 
the government’s primary policy documents. Indeed, the control of government 
expenditures was assured through the scheduling of expenditures by different 
departments. Expenditure claims that exceeded a budget category would not be honored 
for payment.   
British budgetary practices of the mid-19
th century lacked not only many of the 
technical features of the French budgetary system, but  had not adopted the emphasis on 
consistency and universality of application that was central to the underlying public 
sector budget process. For example, although most funds under the mid-19
th century 
British system were appropriated by Parliament, there was no singular document 
reflecting all government expenditures, no comparisons between budgeted expenditures 
versus actual expenditures, and different accounting mechanisms where used by various 
departments. Lump sum appropriations were widely used. During the period when 
William Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer and later Prime Minister, he and 
other reformers integrated many of the more advanced features of French budgetary 
techniques as a way of controlling government finances. For example, in 1861 the Public 
Accounts Committee was created in England. In 1866, the offices of the Comptroller and 
Auditor General were created. Gladstone emphasized the notion of balancing the budget. 
This principal became a technical feature of his budgets (Webber and Wildavsky 1986). 
Thus by the end of the 19
th century the framework for modern government budgeting 
(unity, balance, comprehensiveness, and control) had emerged in Europe.   
In contrast to Europe, budget reform in the United States was initially established 
at the local not national government levels. This was in part due to the fact that the public 
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 had more direct control over local activities. Mass immigration, coupled with increasing 
industrialization and urbanization, created large demands upon local governments for 
housing, education, health care and transportation (Rabin 1997; Webber and Wildavsky 
1986). To more efficiently manage these increasing demands on government services, 
standardized accounting, reporting, and auditing practices were introduced. 
The budgeting process in the United States was largely impacted by two 
competing coalitions: (1) The Federalists (Whigs) who supported an active government 
to promote commerce, build infrastructure necessary for economic activity, and develop 
the financial institutions necessary to support economic growth; and, (2) The Republicans 
(Democratic Republicans, then later Democrats) who believed that taxes should be kept 
low and government kept at a minimum so that small farmers and tradesman could freely 
pursue their trade without government hindrance (Rabin 1997). Competing coalitions 
were kept in equilibrium through the norm of a balanced budget. The norm of a balanced 
budget solidified into a practical limitation on government activity. Rather than 
developing the technical capabilities to control spending as was occurring in Europe, the 
United States controlled budgetary outlays simply by keeping the government small 
(Webber and Wildavsky 1986). Congress itself had no mechanism to ensure that 
appropriate spending was being implemented without modifications. 
To address the problems of mounting debt, the fragmentation of power and the 
absence of public accountability and control in combating corruption 19
th and 20
th 
century budget reformers in the U.S. proposed an array of improvements including 
uniform accounting and auditing practices, and a series of practices for financial planning 
and administration that came to be known as the executive budget movement. Central to 
the reforms in the U.S. of this era was the concept of the responsible executive (i.e., a 
strong mayor). In effect, reformers were adopting many of the business practices of the 
day with strong executive authority (i.e. a strong business executive). The first principal 
of this movement became that budgets should be developed and proposed by the 
executive to accomplish stated objectives for which the executive would later be held 
accountable to the voters. For fiscal clarity, budgets would be unified and encompass not 
only expenditures but also revenues. Public sector budgeting would essentially follow the 
practice of American corporations by being comprehensive, balanced and annual (Taylor 
1911). A uniform accounting system, the establishment of a comptroller, and protocols 
for both reporting and auditing would aid the development and implementation of the 
budget. 
A key development in budget theory has been the differentiation between micro-
budgeting and macro-budgeting and the inherent tension between them (LeLoup, 1988). 
Macro-budgeting is where high level decisions on spending, revenue and deficit 
aggregates and relative budget share are often made from the top down. Micro-budgeting 
is where intermediate level decisions on agencies, programs, and line-items are usually 
made from the bottom up. Both levels of budgeting analysis are interested in how power 
is structured in budgetary processes as well as how it is exercised and expressed through 
budgetary choices. These techniques helped to link budgeting to a larger agenda of 
improving public sector performance.  
The evolution of budget theory and policy-making practices illustrates that 
undeniable progress has been achieved, often on modest fronts and with reasonably 
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 simple techniques. Budget practices across the globe have been gradually evolving into 
becoming more uniform with respect to accounting and auditing practices, balance, and 
control. Lost in the evolution of effective budgeting practices is the identification of 
demand side (social accountability to the local community) issues of identification of 
needs (budget planning), managerial efficiency (budget execution), and effectiveness of 
implementation (budget execution). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, both national and subnational governments have 
witnessed dramatic changes in budgeting. Along the way, decentralization became an 
important component of public sector reform efforts eliminating the planning 
bureaucracy’s monopoly over the budget. In many countries “[w]idespread interest in 
democratization encouraged devolution of authority to autonomous municipal 
governments as counterweights to the centralized governments of the past, and in holding 
regularly scheduled elections to transfer power from traditional national level ruling elites 
to accountable elected officials” (Guess 1997:248). In these countries, transition from 
centrally planned systems to democracies led to a demand for greater accountability, 
which in return required a transparent financial management system. An ongoing 
challenge for countries in implementing decentralization programs is to develop 
coordinated budgetary and financial management reform policies across levels of 
government to ensure correspondence with national macroeconomic objectives for 
inflation, growth, fiscal and monetary stabilization (Ter-Minassian, 1997) and linking 
better budget formulation and expenditure processes to proactive civil involvement and 
oversight. 
3  Connecting Budget with Policy Objectives 
Budgeting takes place within a political arena and the outcome is a political 
document through which money is appropriated according to value judgments by 
decision makers to reflect the community’s values, preferences and priorities 
(Gildenhuys, 1997). In order to understand the budgeting process it is necessary to 
understand the accompanying processes of policy and planning. Studying budgeting 
entails identifying coalitions, understanding the distribution of roles among various 
stakeholders and the incentive structures to which they respond, and predicting outcomes 
to be expected in terms of amounts requested and received (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974). 
A local municipal budget is not just a statement of government finances but is the 
link between the mobilization of funds and attainment of government goals and 
objectives. A government, both central and local, should have specific policies, plans and 
programs to achieve its long-term goals. Although developing broad goals could be part 
of a separate strategic planning process, financing for the achievement of these goals 
comes from the budget. As a result, local governments need to give adequate attention 
towards establishing linkages between policy objectives and budgeting exercise and 
ensuring that those high priority policy objectives are appropriately funded. The budget 
should be the centerpiece of a thoughtful, ongoing, decision-making process for 
allocating resources and setting priorities and direction. 
Today, many national and local governments across the globe are trying to move 
away from input-oriented incremental line item budgeting to output-oriented results-
driven budgeting practice, such as program budgeting, performance budgeting, and 
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 target-based budgeting. In these countries, budget reform programs intend to break the 
domination of hierarchies and provide flexibility to public sector managers in decision-
making. Experience from many developing countries suggests that establishing linkages 
among budgeting and planning systems has been a difficult task. In many developing and 
middle-income countries, planning and programming exercises are ineffective due to 
various reasons including lack of capacity and data. Evidence so far indicates that there 
also are significant shortcomings with regard to public financial accountability measures 
in preventing the misuse of public resources, resulting in fraud and corruption, among 
others. We briefly explore the gradual evolution from line item to program budgeting at 
the local municipal government level in the following sections. 
3.1  Line Item Budget: The Predominant Method of Local Government Budgeting 
Municipal budgets have historically been constructed on the basis of incremental 
line-item budgeting practice, perhaps reflecting the accounting (or bookkeeping) 
background of their municipal staff members, and the close relationship of the budget to 
the audited financial statements required to be submitted by municipal authorities after 
the fiscal year. However, in many municipalities actual spending may be controlled and 
managed on a broader, less detailed level. Monitoring and controlling budget 
expenditures on a broader, less detailed level allows for some degree of flexibility in 
spending while still exercising substantial control in minimizing any potential for 
expenditure overruns.   
The primary orientation of a line-item budget is that of expenditure control and 
local administrative accountability. Normally, funds spent on line items and staffing 
levels are described as budgetary inputs. Accordingly, a certain type of performance 
measure can reflect the progress of a local government organization with respect to 
spending in accord with its line item budget. While the simplest budget to prepare, the 
line-item budget does not provide any information regarding activities and functions of a 
program, department, or municipality. The line-item budget assists municipal officials in 
understanding how much they are spending on salaries, supplies, and maintenance, but 
does not reveal how much is being spent on the actual delivery of services.  
The line-item budget however, does not provide any information regarding the 
achievements of an organization, department or government. Kitchen (2005:156) 
observes that “the incrementalist (line item) approach …provides no mechanism for 
assessing the benefits from existing expenditures and, therefore, no rationale for 
encouraging local officials to allocate their resources in an efficient manner … In 
essence, control budgeting is important but it often creates a narrow and cumbersome 
financial system characterized by paperwork, detail, duplication, complexity, and 
inflexibility.”  Knowing how much you are spending for salaries, supplies, maintenance, 
and utilities does not reveal much about the actual delivery of services such as: How 
many citizens are being provided with social services? How many kilometers of roads are 
maintained? What is the cost per kilometer of maintained roads? How many children are 
in school? What is the quality of education?  
Municipal budget reforms of the last two decades have focused on how to inject a 
long-term perspective into the existing incremental budget practice in order to reorient 
local budgeting practice on results and outcomes. Traditional line-item budgeting makes 
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 achieving these goals very difficult. The main problem of incremental line item 
budgeting is that the expenditure items are related to business needs, such as wage and 
salary, operations and maintenance, rather than achieving a broader program or policy 
objectives. The line item budget tells nothing about the cost or efficiency of programs 
delivered, and provides very little information to decision makers and the local 
constituency on how expenditures were prioritized or which programs/projects should be 
financed or cut. In order to determine the cost of service delivery, expenditures must be 
re-arranged into programs or activities. Further, the line-item budget may have a 
timeframe of a single budget cycle and therefore does not consider the multi-year 
implications of the decisions made.  
Many local municipal governments have introduced process and format reforms 
reflecting more current thinking about the achievement of goals rather than strictly 
focusing on cost control.  For example, over the last five years, Dubai municipality in the 
United Arab Emirates has introduced a programmatic budget structure at the local 
municipal level.  While still in its infancy, Dubai municipality’s programmatic budget 
structure has achieved limited success in mapping its programs, outcomes and outputs.  
The municipality has introduced new budget features in-step with upgrading its financial 
management systems. However, the complexity of undertaking many overlapping 
reforms all at once has tempered the success, to some extent, of the movement towards 
greater budget accountability. Notwithstanding the evolutionary movement to alternative 
budget format reforms, the importance of cost control as a fundamental feature of the 
reformed budget is still maintained.  As part of an ongoing process, municipalities are 
increasingly linking their budget formulation and expenditure management efforts to 
performance measures and greater public sector accountability.   
3.2  Program Budgeting at the Local Government Level  
Budgetary systems found under the name of program budgeting often vary in their 
structure as a result of being adapted to local conditions. The general features of program 
budgeting applied to local governments listed by Bellamy and Kluvers (1995) as: 
defining objectives and programs to achieve those objectives; appropriation by programs; 
use of performance indicators to measure program outputs, and in some cases use of 
cost/benefits or other forms of financial or economic analysis. 
A local government program budget differs from the traditional line-item 
approach to preparing, reviewing, and presenting the budget. In a program budget, 
revenues and expenditures are linked to multi-year community goals and objectives—
establishing political accountability links. The underlying theme of any local government 
program budget structure is to provide greater clarity to local community as to what the 
community’s shared goals are, the priority of these shared goals and to provide the 
community with an indication of whether these goals have been achieved or not.   
Program areas often utilized by local governments include public safety, public works, 
human services, leisure services, and general government.  
The primary point of reference of program budgeting is that it allows municipal 
leaders and community members to plan a budget in a manner that allows for improved 
decision-making creating stronger accountability links between local residents and 
decision makers. The emphasis is on the attainment of long-term local community goals. 
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 A program budget identifies the anticipated results and outputs and outcomes of spending 
items and helps to address the local government’s proper role and responsibility in 
addressing the needs of the community.   
Research on local government program budgets in the United States and Australia 
indicate that it has become an accepted management tool. Poister and Streib (1989) found 
that the percentage of cities using program budgeting in the United States had stabilized 
by the end of the 1980s to about 77 percent of all municipalities. What have been the 
general consequences of adopting program budgeting at the local government level? 
Tower (1998) and Kluvers (2001) surmise that costs were better controlled under 
program budgeting than under line-item budgeting; and, local government program 
budget practitioners were able to sort out expenditures into direct and allocated costs 
more efficiently. Although research results offer support for the proposition that local 
program budgets enable greater cost control, the results are not overwhelming.      
Efforts to introduce performance based program budgeting are useful in allowing 
the local community to examine costs in detail and to connect expenditures to expected 
outcomes. However, local governments, particularly in developing and many middle-
income countries, often face significant human resource constraints in implementing this 
type of budgeting and the concomitant change in the accounting mechanisms that it 
requires. While program budgeting systems may be an attractive tool to generate 
accountability in spending agencies at all levels of governments, many countries often 
lack the necessary preconditions and preparatory work at the local government level for 
effective implementation.  
Apart from thorough prior planning and capacity building, the introduction of 
program budgeting requires a relatively advanced state of performance measurement, 
accounting and financial management systems being in place. These preconditions do not 
appear to currently exist in many developing and some middle-income country local 
municipal governments. Moreover, introducing program budgeting before the 
foundations for ordinary budgeting (i.e. effective accounting, reporting and monitoring) 
are fully in place risks undermines the overall development of the budgetary and financial 
management of the government. Without effective budget tracking tools, which in many 
developing countries are non-existent at the local government level, it would be 
premature to rush into program budgeting.  Nonetheless, even in such countries where 
subnational government budgeting practices are more fundamental, a performance 
orientation to budgeting and steps toward managing for performance can be introduced, 
albeit in a more simple form.  With respect to multi- or bi-lateral technical assistance, 
donors should be prudent in advocating the adoption of performance (program) budgeting 
simultaneous with more participatory forms of budgeting. If enacted simultaneously, 
these two reforms may overwhelm local governments and constituents trying to adjust to 
the new system.  
The conditions under which local governments have the right incentive(s) to 
improve the delivery of basic services have been explored in large volumes of political 
economy literature. Keefer and Khemani (2005) propose providing citizens with greater 
information about the resources and responsibilities of their local representatives, so that 
they are empowered to hold them accountable for the delivery of basic services.  The next 
section describes how the local community can hold municipalities and municipal budget 
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 practitioners accountable for improving the quality of budget presentation and the 
effectiveness of budget service delivery performance. 
4  Achieving Decentralized Accountability 
The case for decentralization is fundamentally an argument about improving the 
process of governance that matches collective (e.g., public) decision-making with respect 
to subnational (e.g., local) tax and spending decisions to local preferences (Yilmaz, Beris, 
Serrano-Berthet 2008). The “best” solution is one of an intergovernmental partnership 
that builds on the platform of fiscally strong local, provincial, and central governments. 
To make this all work there must be accountability; that is, mechanisms (formal systems, 
institutions, laws, regulations, as well as the informal day-to-day practice of government) 
must be put in place such that two things occur: political leaders and bureaucrats become 
answerable to the citizenry for their actions and the citizenry takes on and accepts 
responsibility for the collective actions that governments make on their behalf.    
 
4.1  Bottom-up Pressures: The Missing Link in Budgeting Reforms 
In a well functioning local government budget and managerial structure, a local 
government is subject to accountability to its citizens, accountability to public agencies 
and accountability to higher-level governments. These kinds of accountability are 
referred to as: bottom up—by the local government to local citizens; horizontal 
accountability—by the local government to various public institutions of accountability; 
and vertical accountability by the local government to higher-level governments.   
Bottom-up accountability may include citizens acting through the electoral process or 
indirectly through civic organizations (i.e. NGOs, civil society) or the news media (See 
Figure 1).   
Horizontal accountability covers the range of public entities in order to check 
local government abuses and inefficiencies. These agencies may include but are not 
limited to:  electoral commissions, local government councils (or legislature), the court 
system, ombudsman or public complaints agencies, or various auditing agencies. Local 
governments are also held accountable to higher-level governments (e.g., central, state). 
Central (and, state) governments often set the rules under which local governments 
operate.  Additionally, higher-level governments nearly always provide a portion of their 
financial resources to local governments through fiscal transfers. Thus, there is always 
some level of financial (budgetary) reporting and accountability by local governments to 
higher governmental authorities.  





Citizens / Electorate 
Civic Organizations 
Media 
  Courts 
  Ombudsman 
  Auditing Agencies 
  Anti-corruption Agencies 
  Local Government Council 
Horizontal Accountability
Bottom-Up Accountability
Vertical Accountability – Top-Down 
Central 
Government 
Figure 1:  Accountability Linkages 
Internal administrative accountability must be mirrored by external accountability 
through feedback from service users and citizens (the social accountability nexus). 
Strengthening local government accountability is necessary in the context of enhancing 
initiatives for greater decentralization and for local government managerial autonomy. 
Effective local budget development requires establishment of expenditure priorities. This 
process begins with a planning or a preplanning stage during which information flows are 
both top down and bottom up. Top-down processes establish parameters for budget 
development in the form of directives to agencies and spending units. These directives 
should communicate fiscal framework objectives, resource and cost forecast and 
assumptions, the budget envelope and broad policy priorities. Bottom-up processes 
should establish linkages with communities to identify people’s needs and preferences. 
Of particular importance are the legal and budgetary instruments that require input from 
local community members on certain local government decisions and instruments that 
increase accessibility for the press or the general public at large to information on 
government activities. 
In this process, bottom-up accountability may similarly fall short if elections are 
dominated by political elites (Mair and Katz 1997), or if the electorate has few other 
ways to register its views on the quality of governance, or lacks the capacity to organize 
itself effectively (Mungui-Ppidi 2003). Furthermore, institutional weaknesses (e.g., audit 
bodies, courts) may create an environment where horizontal and vertical accountability 
frequently fall short. To strengthen bottom-up accountability there must also be a set of 
mechanisms (systems, strategies, and institutions), formal and informal, that becomes the 
“way of doing” government. These mechanisms can be divided into several categories 
including information; consultation; oversight; and, community participation (See Table 
1). The challenge in implementing these mechanisms for public sector accountability lies 
in creating an enabling political context where such mechanisms can be introduced and 
be sustained. 
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 Table 1: Mechanisms for Advancing Public Sector Accountability 
Accountability 
Mechanisms 
Task  Method 
Information  Provision  of  Information  Mandatory provision of information by the government (e.g., 
public hearings, annual reports, newsletters); citizen-led sources 
such as service delivery “scorecard” surveys. 
  Financial Disclosure  Timely accounting and budget information (e.g., quarterly reports 
followed by audited financial reports). 
  Financial Management 
Systems 
Use of financial management information systems (which, for 
example, can provide citizens on-line access to key indicators of 
performance). 
  Competitive Procurement  Local  government procurement processes must be transparent, 
open, and, for larger projects, competitive. 
Consultation / 
Oversight 
Notice and Comment on 
Rule-making 
Requirement that draft normative acts be published in public 
forums prior to their enactment. 
  Public hearings  Public hearings may be required by law. 
 
  Administrative Procedure 
Systems 
Administrative procedures should require that citizens receive 
notice prior to any change in legislation or other action. 
  Advisory Committees  Permanent or ad hoc bodies that provide input to government in 
various policy areas.  
Active 
Participation 
Right to Petition  The public has the right to propose the adoption, amendment or 
repeal of a normative act. 
  Consensus/Negotiated 
Rulemaking 
Councils that consult with groups must reach consensus with 




controlled media (print and 
electronic) 
Require government to inform the independent press of its 
activities, from procurement practices to budget reports. 
Source: Russell-Einhorn (2004); Renikka and Svensson (2004); Authors. 
 
4.2  Central and Local Government Reporting Relationship   
A fundamental issue is that of the appropriate role of central government in 
promoting and ensuring the vertical accountability and the efficacy of local government 
financial reporting.  This can be a tricky matter since the very manner that the issue is 
phrased as the “role of the central government” not only presumes a hierarchy among 
governments, but also that the central authority has the capacity and integrity to be in a 
position to monitor its subnational governments. The complement of fiscal 
decentralization is the need for regular, timely and comprehensive reporting from local 
governments to the central government’s Ministry of Finance. This should be an accepted 
norm as the cornerstone of the accountability compact between central and subnational 
governments. It is entirely reasonable that the Ministry of Finance insist on it as a 
condition of fiscal decentralization.  
Central governments have an important role in monitoring local government 
financial performance and reporting and collecting intergovernmental (including 
provincial and local) data.  However, if the central government seizes upon this 
monitoring as a justification for interfering with what is a subnational/local competency 
then this tension represents a destructive rather than positive or “healthy” sign of robust 
intergovernmental relations. The central government’s role can arguably extend beyond 
mere monitoring of local government’s performance and collection of data if local 
governments are delivering services for which the central government has the primary 
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policy responsibility.  This is a relatively common situation, in practice, in areas such as 
education, health and agriculture.  Under these circumstances, local governments should 
be viewed as service delivery agencies responsible to the central government rather than 
autonomous bodies, and the need for interference or a stronger central government role 
should be re-evaluated.  The accountability relationship under this circumstance is quite 
complex.   
Clearly, the need for improved local government accountability must be balanced 
by the need for strong and effective control and reporting of fiscal aggregates. Seen from 
the Finance Minister’s perspective, greater decentralization is a mixed blessing: while 
service delivery may be enhanced, fiscal control and local government financial reporting 
may be worsened, as spending, revenue collection and subnational borrowing powers are 
expanded. This is not an idle concern, since weaker aggregate control undermines 
macroeconomic performance and a country’s development capacity.    
5  Demand Side Pressures for Downward Accountability 
Public accountability mechanisms are for safeguarding against misuse and abuse 
of budgetary resources; but they have their imperfections. Over the last decade, a number 
of social accountability mechanisms have emerged in response to the weaknesses of 
public financial accountability systems. These demand side tools that can be instrumental 
in identification of needs and preferences of citizens and preventing the misuse and 
misallocation of public resources including: making local government financial 
information (including budgets and end-of-year financial statements) accessible to the 
public; allowing strong public involvement in budgetary process through participatory 
budgeting practices; and initiating independent budget analysis and participatory public 
expenditure tracking programs that monitor budget execution and leakage of funds.
3 
These new forms of accountability mechanisms, which enable direct engagement of 
citizens with government, emerge to complement public accountability mechanisms. 
However, public and social accountability approaches must be bridged to ensure that 
citizens have the ability and opportunity to demand accountability and local governments 
have the means and incentives to respond to citizen demands for accountability and better 
delivery of services (Yilmaz, Beris and Berthet 2008). 
Institutions of local accountability in developing countries are often weak, with 
the attendant risk of ‘capture’ of public resources by local elite (Bardhan 2002). For 
example, when local government revenues are largely coming from taxpayers outside the 
local jurisdiction through intergovernmental grants, as is often the case in developing 
countries with geographic concentration of national resources and low revenue potential, 
there is a greater risk of capture because local citizens might not be informed about what 
resources are available to their local representatives for the delivery of public services 
(Khemani 2006).   
In their empirical work designed to identify major drivers of corruption, Gurgur 
and Shah (2002) find that lack of service orientation in the public sector, weak 
democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), a colonial past, internal 
bureaucratic controls and centralized decision-making are major causes of local 
                                                 
3 A detailed discussion of these tools and their application see Yilmaz, Beris and Serrano-Berthet (2008).  corruption. They argue that, when well designed, accountable decentralization enhances 
public sector performance and reduces corruption. Suffice it to note here that in order to 
advance this outcome, multiple mechanisms of organizational and institutional capacity 
building may need to take root in order for local government accountability to prove 
effective (Blair 2000).   
5.1  Local Government Must Show Leadership 
The challenge of opening the budget process to public oversight and scrutiny are 
political. Even in a democratizing, and decentralizing, context many government officials 
continue to resist the notion that budgets should be shared with the public. Strengthening 
of the demand side budgetary process can only be accomplished in localities where the 
head of the local government is willing to show leadership on this issue. Resistance at 
lower levels of the bureaucracy will only give way in the face of an environment that is 
supportive of these efforts.  
Opening up the budgetary process to sharing and discussing information may be 
as simple as just training local government councils on legal requirements and 
establishing systems to monitor budget and service delivery performance. In countries 
with weak accountability and high levels of corruption, where actual budget expenditures 
are at risk of being spent on non-budget items, budget monitoring is at least as useful an 
area for public involvement as budget planning.  
A major issue in many developing countries is the scrutiny of recurrent budgets. 
As Ahmad and Weiser (2006: 40) point out although “[t]he development portion of the 
budget is well contested, scrutinized for inter-constituency comparisons, and debated 
upon,” the recurrent portion of the budget in many countries receives very little attention. 
This means that most of the budgetary outlay is not analyzed and nor subject to debate.  
In Pakistan, for example, “tehsil” councils’ share of salaries and other operating costs 
represent a significant portion of local government operational budgets. In 2006, the 
provincial government increased salaries to government employees by 30-40%, while 
only increasing budget transfers to local governments by only 10%.  As a result, local 
governments scrambled to rearrange their budgets to accommodate the higher wage 
levels. Consequently, the level of development funds was significantly reduced, and 
funds were reallocated to cover the higher wage bill.  
5.2  Improving Local Public Sector Accountability  
Improving local public sector accountability requires a complex approach that 
recognizes the diverse factors underlying the persistence of weak governance. What are 
the lessons that can be drawn from the international experience? Actions to improve local 
governance, public financial management and accountability need to be taken on 
numerous fronts.   
The linkage between central and local government should not be overlooked since 
it can have significant positive (or adverse) effects on the accountability of local 
governments to their citizens. What is the appropriate role of central government to 
ensure accountability of local governments? The role of the central government in 
ensuring local government accountability is to ensure that: local governments are 
provided with services in accordance with the assignment of powers and functions to 
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 local governments; and all local government resources (including the funds that are 
transferred to the local government by the central government) should be utilized 
efficiently and in the manner intended. The two dimensions describing central and local 
governments inherently create some tension between the various levels of government. 
For example, in a decentralized environment, central governments devolve many 
expenditure assignments to local governments. Often, local governments (correctly) 
argue that many of these devolved expenditures are not fully funded. As a result, this 
leads to a lack of accountability by the local government. From the local government’s 
public expenditure point of view, it is essential that when the central government 
devolves expenditure responsibilities, that they be fully funded. This would enhance local 
government accountability to local residents. 
Unless the public knows what goods and services are provided, how well they are 
provided, who the beneficiaries are, and how much they cost, it cannot demand (nor 
expect) effective government. To promote government accountability, government 
budgets and expenditure programs need to be disclosed to the public. Governments that 
do not yet have laws or regulations allowing for public consultation and monitoring of 
budgets should consider enacting such legislation. Governments that have already created 
such a framework should be encouraged to ensure that other parts of the budget rules are 
consistent with public participation and may wish to consider issuing general guidelines 
to local governments highlight best practice in implementing public consultation.   
Perhaps due to the urgency of delivering services and ensuring that budgets are 
passed in a timely manner, consultative activity during the budget cycle almost 
exclusively focuses on budget preparation only and enactment. Mechanisms to monitor 
the use of funds or evaluate the impact of programs have proven to be generally weak or 
non-existent. The monitoring of local government budgets can take the form of 
legislative or community-based committees. In countries with weak accountability 
systems in place and where actual budget expenditures are at risk of being spent on non-
budget activities, budget monitoring is at least as useful an areas for community based 
involvement as budget planning. 
5.3  Consultation and Participation at the Local Level 
Over the last two decades, there has been a substantial body of anecdotal evidence 
about the positive impact of consultative and participatory mechanisms in improving 
local service delivery. Most development practitioners and academics see participatory 
mechanisms as a process that allows citizens to be involved in debating, deliberating and 
influencing the distribution of public resources (Shah 2007, Wagle and Shah 2003).   
Participatory mechanisms encompass a range of initiatives where ordinary citizens and 
residents have the opportunity to prioritize spending decisions, influence resource 
allocation and monitor public spending. These participatory mechanisms are increasingly 
seen as an important tool to promote good governance by ensuring that social policies 
and public spending are more equitable, strengthening transparency and accountability, 
giving greater voice to citizens, especially marginalized residents and the poor, and 
enhancing deliberative democracy. 
In this context, participatory budgeting is seen a powerful good governance tool 
in the context of the growing trend of decentralization across the world (Zamboni 2007, 
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 Reames and Lynott 2006, United Nations 2005). Three key impacts of participatory 
budgeting are that they spur administrative reform, promote social justice and social 
inclusion objectives by involving socially excluded groups and altering spending 
priorities towards more equitable and sustainable objectives, and enhance democratic 
citizenship (Shah 2007, Reames and Lynott 2006). Furthermore, Ackerman (2003) claims 
that participatory budgeting structures reduce corrupt behavior and the political use of 
public funds thereby limiting opportunities for state capture. 
There are four inter-related arguments that explain the rise of public participation 
in decision-making: citizen participation is a logical shift from insulated modes of 
governance to more open and transparent mechanisms in the post-modern age; 
disillusionment with bureaucracy; the search for democratic ideal; and the need for 
participation in developing countries (Shah 2007). In general, frustrated with the 
continuous failure of the state in addressing citizen’s needs in an equal and fair manner 
and in recognition of the perceived challenges faced by an introverted public 
administration and the inadequacies in the functioning of representative democracies, a 
demand for a re-examination of the existing governance arrangements, particularly that of 
the policy-making processes became imminent (United Nations 2005, Shah 2007). 
Participatory budgeting emerged as part of a larger effort in Brazil to extend and 
deepen existing democracy (Abers 1996; Wampler 2000, Santos 1998). Scholars attribute 
the Porto Alegre experience to a range of enabling political and social factors that were 
unique to Brazil. The 1988 constitutional reform in Brazil strengthened the scope of 
decentralization and gave mayors the opportunity to innovate especially in areas of 
participatory planning and management. The significant increase in local revenues 
following the 1988 reforms and the availability of resources that the municipality could 
allocate at its own discretion was a key factor in prompting demands for greater 
accountability and participation in decisions regarding the use of funds. The growing 
influence of social movements such as Movimento Dos Sem Terra and left leaning 
parties in a number of municipalities also helped to create a platform for popular 
participation in local decision-making (Wampler 2000, Fung and Wright 2001). 
Participatory budgeting mechanisms and processes vary across countries and 
contexts and there is no agreement on what participatory budgeting means or how to go 
about it. The specific definitions and methodologies associated with participatory 
budgeting usually derive from Brazilian experiences, and especially that of Porto Alegre.  
These definitions tend to emphasize a process that combines direct and representative 
democracy, involves deliberation (and not merely consultation), is redistributive towards 
the poor, and is self-regulating, such that participants help define the rules governing the 
process, including the criteria by which resources are allocated (Goldfrank 2006).    
In the Brazilian context, participatory budgeting practice is based on a complex 
set of rules and involves a year-long cycle of meetings which allows communities to 
decide on the allocation of resources for capital investments in the annual municipal 
budget. In a series of neighborhood, regional, and citywide assemblies, residents and 
elected budget delegates identify spending priorities and vote on which priorities to 
implement. An important part of the process is the formation of the Participatory Budget 
Council whose delegates are elected each year.  In other countries, participatory 
budgeting encompasses a broader set of practices and includes mechanisms that make 
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 information about public budgets clearer and more accessible; efforts to increase 
participation in all stages of budgeting and not just allocation, and efforts to strengthen 
participation and capacity among socially excluded and under-represented groups such as 
women to influence the local budgeting process (Reames and Lynott 2006, Shah 2007). 
Unlike the Brazilian experience, often, civil society organizations can take the 
lead in facilitating participation at the local level. Such an approach is exemplified by the 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), an NGO that combines advocacy, 
training, and research. IDASA specializes in budget analysis, providing detailed policy 
analyses of proposed resource allocation choices. In 1995, IDASA began analyzing the 
budget from the perspective of women (the Women’s Budget) and children (the 
Children’s Budget).  In India, a citizen-initiated public advocacy exercises were effective 
in bringing citizens’ concerns about spending priorities to the attention of local officials, 
office holders and representatives.  DISHA – an NGO with a broad membership of 
indigenous people – created a simple way to demystify and monitor budget allocations 
(Shah 2007).  Wagle and Shah (2003) argue that the work of DISHA substantially 
enhanced the quality of debate on the budget, both inside the state assembly and outside, 
serving as an effective channel of feedback to the government. Participatory processes in 
Europe and North America also vary considerably from the Porto Alegre example. 
Participatory practices vary based on the extent and depth of participation as well as the 
extent of budget subject to consultation. In recent pilots in New Castle and Bradford UK, 
consultations were held with neighborhoods to decide on how to spend small sums of 
extra money. Participatory tools are also beginning to be used in Canada.  Guelph, a local 
municipal government, in Ontario is using participatory mechanisms to allocate a small 
portion of the City's budget. Through the Guelph Neighborhood Support Coalition, 
neighborhood groups share and redistribute resources for local community projects, such 
as recreation programs, youth services, and physical improvements to community 
facilities (Lerner and Wagner 2006). 
Participatory budgeting practices have achieved mixed results. A review of the 
effectiveness of participatory budgeting indicates that substantial local interactions are 
required to ensure that funds are not diverted from expressed local community objectives.  
Studies on the impact of participatory budgeting in Brazil have found a trend towards 
spending more in less favored neighborhoods, inhabited by lower income families and 
improvements in governance (Abers, 1996 & 1998; Baiocchi, 2001; Avritzer, 2002, 
Zamboni 2007). In other studies, Baiocchi, Heller, Chaudhuri, and Silva (2005) find that 
adoption of participatory budgeting increases opportunity for citizen engagement and 
empowerment and has significant impact on reducing poverty and improving access to 
basic services; Schnieder and Baquero (2006) argue that in Porto Alegre tax revenues 
have also expanded significantly following the adoption of participatory budgeting; and 
Fisman and Gatti (1998) provide evidence about the positive impact of consultative and 
participatory mechanisms in improving local service delivery.  
  While participatory budgeting represents a promising approach for strengthening 
the demand side of governance, institutionalizing participatory processes can be 
challenging. A combination of four factors makes it more likely that participatory 
budgeting programs will be adopted: enabling legislation and strong political support, a 
vibrant civil society willing and able to contribute to ongoing policy debates, a generally 
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 supportive political environment that insulates participatory budgeting from legislators’ 
attacks and financial resources to fund the projects selected by citizens. Critics argue that 
participatory budgeting creates a conflict of legitimacy by exposing tensions between 
participatory democracy and representative democracy as has been the case in Porto 
Alegre where the legislature has lost some powers (Utzig 2007). A primary weakness of 
participatory budgeting is that it principally focuses on specific public works only and 
does not really engage citizens around discussions on broader social policies and long-
term planning.   
  Given the mixed country experiences and paucity of research on impacts of 
participatory budgeting, it is difficult to generalize on either success or failure of 
participatory budgeting initiatives. We provide that while the mechanics of the 
participatory budgeting exercise may be different in South Africa and Chile than Malawai 
and Cambodia, there is a need to advance the participatory process in all countries.   
While participatory budgeting can be a tool for better governance and can work in favor 
of the poor, three key factors underpin its success. i) normative, citizen participation has 
to be given a legal basis; (ii) regulative, an operational framework of participation with 
clear definition of roles and functions including the methodology of participation must be 
mutually agreed upon and put in place; and finally, (iii) regenerative, participation 
practice warrants several capacity building interventions involving both the civil society 
as well as the government organizations (United Nations 2005). 
6  The Future of Budget Reform 
Cynicism about the manner in which governments finance their operations has 
provided a stimulus for various budget reforms. Constantly disappointed by their efforts, 
budget reformers reach back and try again. However, focusing budget reform efforts 
exclusively on the budget document and process alone may be aiming at the wrong 
target. Citizens have an enormous stake in how local government funds are being spent, 
but are not normally admitted to the key decision making bodies that establish spending 
priorities and certainly not to auditing processes of the public budget.   
One thing that is clear, citizens are demanding more direct and meaningful 
engagement in accountability systems. Voting at election time is no longer sufficient.  
The result of these pent-up demands has been widespread experimentation with novel 
techniques demanding answers and enforcement sanctions. When it comes to scrutinizing 
public spending, the near impossibility of obtaining certified (audited) government 
accounts implies that most citizen efforts can go no further than (participatory) budget 
formulation at the local level, or else budget analysis at high levels of aggregation, 
identifying the likely impact of proposed public spending on categories such as the poor.   
Clarity of local government budgeting formats significantly impacts whether civil 
society can evaluate and monitor local government expenditures. Oftentimes, this is 
particularly true when monitoring the current (operational or administrative) expenditure 
portion of the budget, which receives almost no review by the public or local government 
legislative (council) branch. Efforts to introduce performance (program) budgeting are 
useful in allowing the general public to examine costs in detail and to connect 
expenditures to expected outcomes. However, local governments are often confronted 
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 with human resource (ability) constraints in implementing this type of budgeting and the 
underlying accounting systems.     
Efforts to strengthen budgetary process are most likely to meet with success in 
developing countries and in localities that have some underlying (effective) legal and 
regulatory framework that is supportive of public involvement in governance processes.  
National, and local, governments that do not have effective laws and regulations allowing 
for public consultation and monitoring of budgets should consider enacting such 
legislation. Governments that have already created such a framework should be further 
encouraged to ensure that other parts of the budget rules and consistent with public 
participation process. These governments may also wish to consider issuing rules and 
guidelines for ensuring more effective public consultation in the budgeting development, 
oversight and monitoring process.  
Demand side measures for financial accountability include publicly accessible 
local government financial information (including budgets and end-of-year financial 
statements); public involvement in budgetary process through participatory budgeting 
practices; gender-sensitive planning, budgeting, and resource allocation, reinforced by 
gender audits; independent budget analysis and participatory public expenditure tracking 
programs that monitor budget execution and leakage of funds.  
Only when citizens attain not only effective involvement in the budget 
formulation process but in the expenditure management side via more direct auditing, 
more direct expenditure analysis and control, of financial systems will full public sector 
budget accountability be achieved.  Community (demand-side) participation is necessary, 
but not an adequate condition, for enabling greater local government accountability. 
Community based schemes for enhancing local government accountability generally need 
to combine legal, political, and administrative mechanisms (more effective budgeting, 
public oversight of local government expenditures, enforcement) with proactive 
community involvement.   
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